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Abstract: This article examines how the interactive capabilities of companion robots, 
particularly their materiality and animate movements, appeal to human users and 
generate an image of aliveness. Building on Husserl’s phenomenological notion of 
a ‘double body’ and theories of emotions as affective responses, we develop a new 
understanding of the robots’ simulated aliveness. Analyzing empirical findings of a 
field study on the use of the robot Zora in care homes for older people, we suggest 
that the aliveness of companion robots is the result of a combination of four aspects: 
1) material ingredients, 2) morphology, 3) animate movements guided by software 
programs and human operators as in Wizard of Oz-settings and 4) anthropomorphis-
ing narratives created by their users to support the robot’s performance. We suggest 
that narratives on affective states, such as, sleepiness or becoming frightened attached 
to the robot trigger users’ empathic feelings, caring and tenderness toward the robot.
Key words: companion robots, phenomenology, morphology, simulated aliveness, 
emotions
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1. Introduction
Many studies in Human-Robot Interaction research report that people experience 
confusion as to the apparent aliveness of the new generation of companion ro-
bots (Turkle 2011). In this article we consider how robot bodies are specifically 
designed to provide an impression of ‘aliveness’ through a combination of their 
material properties and their animate movements. Instead of discussing the re-
semblance of robot bodies to human bodies in the spirit of the so-called ‘Uncanny 
Valley’ (Destephe et al. 2015; Mori 1970), we focus on a ‘hybrid robot body’ that 
can exhibit a collection of emotionally appealing human-like traits like blinking 
eyes, speech and culturally coded dance movements and non-human traits like 
plastic coverage, three finger hands and a slow, stiff, robot-like way of walking. In 
the field of engineering studies, robot bodies are approached from the perspectives 
of morphological computation and robot morphology in order to consider their re-
semblance to different types of biological bodies with human or non-human traits 
(e.g., Hoffmann and Müller 2017). More specifically, morphological computation 
is a concept used in robot engineering to examine physical bodies in the context 
of robotics as a means of carrying out computations considered relevant to their 
successful interaction with the environment (Hauser and Corucci 2017). In our 
analysis, the attractive aliveness of hybrid robot body depends on the way in which 
their materiality (plastic, texture, metal, etc.), morphology (shape, figure), lively 
movements and anthropomorphising narratives, as created by their users, are com-
bined in terms of the robot’s performance. We suggest that the vital impression 
of a robot body is created by its movements, which appeal on an emotional level 
to its audience. Relying on Husserl’s conceptual distinction between the physical 
body (Körper) and the lived body (Leib), we develop a novel conceptualisation 
of a ‘double body,’ which could help to clarify how the material properties of 
robot bodies, including their morphology, are combined with their movements 
or gestures in order to foster an impression of a ‘living body.’ Our research also 
shows that the lived body of the robot is also created by narratives of the emotional 
characters or the physiological needs of the robot that explain, for example, the 
malfunctions of the robot and attribute them to its lived body.
Due to the Cartesian heritage, emotion theories both philosophy and psy-
chology have a tendency to locate affects and feelings into an inner “psyche,” 
separated from the body as well as from the world. As William James (1884) 
already stated, there is no emotion without bodily sensations, feelings and bodily 
resonance. Our phenomenological account of emotion is based on the assumption 
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that emotions are regarded as resulting from the circular interaction between af-
fective affordances in the environment and the subject’s bodily resonance that take 
usually physical forms as facial expression, postures, gestures and movements 
(Fuchs 2013; Fuchs and Koch 2014). Although emotion and affect are often used 
interchangeably, it is important not to confuse emotion with affect, feeling and 
bodily sensation.
In some accounts, the concept of affect refers to unmediated, uncontrolled, 
and unconscious physical reactions, such as sweating, tears, blushing, chills and 
goose pumps, while emotion is understood more as a consciously felt and named, 
innate and/or culturally constructed, controlled and performed expression (Bren-
nan 2004). By bodily sensations, we refer to the body’s awareness of warmth 
or coldness, tickling or shivering, pain, tension or relaxation, etc. The notion of 
feeling refers to social existential states, such as feeling at home in the world 
and with others, feeling welcome or feeling of being rejected or isolated. Thus, 
affects, sensations and feelings both motivate and define emotions and the ways in 
which people interact with other beings and environments through their expressive 
movements and gestures.
Equally, people tend to decode the movements of others, including the mo-
tions of robots, as emotional states that express their personal passion, desire, 
repulsion, apathy or coldness. According to the phenomenological philosophy of 
movement (Sheets-Johnstone 1999), our affective reactions to unknown objects, 
as well as our experiences of different situations and encounters, are strongly 
influenced by the ways in which living or non-living objects move. Taking this 
idea further, robots’ motions and their users’ emotions can be seen as intrinsically 
connected. In other words, the user of a given robot can be affectively moved by 
the movements and ‘gestures’ of that robot, which causes the user to respond in-
tuitively to the robot’s movements as if it was a living being that provokes a variety 
of feelings. Such an intuitive response might cause either positive emotions like 
amusement or negative emotions, for example, bewilderment or embarrassment.
Companion robots developed in the last few years, such as “Zora,” do not 
really remind us of humans or animals, but they are not mere objects either. They 
seem to fall within a new category of ‘quite something else,’ as characterised by 
one of the interviewees in our field study. As companion robots represent a type 
of entity that is completely new to the majority of people, they exist in a grey area 
between human, fictional and animal entities and their respective characteristics. 
As the new generation of companion robots are capable of eliciting a strong feel-
ing of aliveness and consciousness, people are not necessarily prepared to treat 
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them as machines. Cynthia Breazeal (2002) has suggested that we have a tendency 
to interact with companion robots as if they are people or pets, while Kahn et al. 
(2006) have stated that there may now be a need for a new ontological category 
in addition to the traditional distinction between animate and inanimate. Sherry 
Turkle (2011) also has observed this in her seminal work Alone Together as people 
tended to strongly anthromorphize companion robots while, at the same time, they 
pointed out of being aware that the robot is not a living being.
In this article, we use empirical findings of a field study on the use of a 
companion robot to concretise and illustrate our arguments on the animate move-
ments that simulate a living body. The field study was conducted in care homes for 
elderly people, with the Zora robot being used as a companion robot during differ-
ent activity sessions. Zora is a humanoid robot that is advertised as being capable 
of assisting in mobility activities and rehabilitation. Yet, the robotic capabilities of 
Zora cannot be equated with human embodied intelligence.1
Zora is a 57-cm-tall humanoid robot, a health care application built on 
NAO-robot2 (see Photo 1). The NAO robot with this particular software is called, 
marketed and sold with the name of Zora instead of NAO. Zora can be used, 
Photo 1. Zora. (Adapted from a photo by Satu Pekkarinen)
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for example, to assist with exercising, play music or show dance movements, tell 
stories, and play memory and guessing games. Zora is one of the first humanoid 
robots that are commercially available and sold as a care robot. It is steered with 
a tablet or other computer, and it has sensors, a speech synthesizer, four direc-
tional microphones, loudspeakers, and two built-in cameras.3 Zora has human-like 
characteristics: it walks, moves its hands while speaking and blinks its eyes. It is 
pre-programmed to perform several functions, but it is also possible to programme 
the robot with the help of visual icons on the interface; no technical program-
ming skills are required. Before we discuss further the field study with Zora, we 
begin by looking at the development of social companion robots. We introduce 
the phenomenological notion of the body in order to highlight the importance or 
meaning of physical appearance and impressions of ‘aliveness’ and the emotions 
and emotional reactions related to these impressions, as experienced by the users 
of companion robots. Then, we introduce a phenomenological concept known 
as the ‘double body effect’ so as to contribute to the philosophical discussion 
concerning robot bodies. Finally, we discuss the empirical findings of the field 
study on how Zora was received by the older inhabitants of care homes, as well as 
how the staff of the care homes developed narratives to create and sustain shared 
illusions concerning the aliveness of the robot with their residents. The narratives 
were often appealing to emotions like compassion or empathy when the robot’s 
behaviour was explained as if the robot had physiological, social or psychological 
human characteristics or needs.
2. Companion Robots as Performative Media
The question of embodiment in the field of robot design began to receive attention 
during the 1990s, when machines driven by artificial intelligence were shown to 
be capable of emotionally affecting humans (Brooks et al. 1998). This realisation 
brought about a paradigm shift in both the cognitive sciences and the practical 
design principles associated with robotic applications. The first prototypes of 
‘socially intelligent’ robots (e.g., Kismet) were constructed in order to demon-
strate how to utilize natural human cues to interact with and learn from human 
caretakers (Breazeal and Scassellati 1999). Research concerning morphological 
computation and affective computing, which developed from the seminal work 
of Rosalyn Picard published during the mid-1990s (Picard 1997), examined how 
to understand human affections, as well as how to simulate them when design-
ing robotic movements and functions. Currently morphological computation and 
robot morphology focus on the resemblance between robot bodies and different 
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types of biological bodies (e.g., Hoffmann and Müller 2017) and physical bodies 
are studied in order to develop computations and robots that successfully interact 
with the environment (Hauser and Corucci 2017).
According to Ryan Calo (2016), a robot can be defined as an artefact that peo-
ple easily treat as an animate thing. Due to the physical appearances of companion 
robots, people exhibit a tendency to anthropomorphise them and to imagine that 
such devices are capable of more than they actually are. Anthropomorphism is a 
process whereby people attribute distinctly human characteristics to non-humans, 
particularly the capacity for agency in terms of conscious feelings and rational 
thinking (Gray, Gray, and Wegner 2007). People can anthropomorphise their cars, 
their computers or even their kitchen tools, but they are even more likely to ascribe 
human characteristics to pets, which are actually capable of interaction and reci-
procity of a certain kind (Turkle 2011).
People tend to consider robots with human-like features and capabilities as 
being responsible for successful actions and having the ability to perform them 
with conscious awareness, foresight and planning (Malle and Knobe 1997; Waytz, 
Heafner, and Epley 2014). On one hand, people can derive pleasure from acting 
as though a robot has understood them while still being aware that the robot is a 
mechanical object (Turkle 2011). On the other hand, human-like or animal-like 
appearances can encourage and mislead people into thinking that robots are ca-
pable of a greater degree of social understanding than is actually the case. The 
appearance and behaviour of robots suggest that they could serve as adequate re-
placements for human or animal companionship and interaction. Such a reaction 
does not have to be harmful. Yet, some researchers have noted that the use of social 
robots with older and/or cognitively impaired people is ethically dubious, since the 
currently available social robots are deliberately designed to make people believe 
that they are indeed capable of emotions and reciprocity (Sharkey 2014; Sharkey 
and Sharkey 2012; Sparrow and Sparrow 2006).
Currently, the majority of robotic functions are described metaphorically in 
the human-robot interaction literature, which refers to human consciousness capa-
bilities. Robots are said to ‘sense,’ ‘think’ and ‘act’ (e.g., Lin, Abney, and Bekey 
2011). Rather than using the intentionalist vocabulary concerning robotics and 
pretending that robots are people, Johanna Seibt (2014, 2017) argues that research 
should focus on the consideration of both asymmetric sociality and the simulated 
reciprocity in human-robot interactions. Here, simulated reciprocity refers to the 
‘aliveness’ of social robots, and it gives rise to several ethical questions (Turkle 
2011). For instance, what is essential about the aliveness of human beings when 
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compared to the ‘aliveness’ of robots? What is special about being a ‘real’ person 
in comparison with a social robot that is capable of actions and behaviour that 
appear real? How can we identify the expression of ‘real’ emotions as compared 
with simulated emotions that robots display in order to make us feel something?
As social robots have been designed and built with a view to arousing posi-
tive emotions in humans, it is not surprising that humans respond easily to these 
items emotionally and even assume that the robotic interaction partners them-
selves can experience feelings, such as compassion. Most people want to be heard 
and listened to, so these robots touch on very basic human needs (Turkle 2011). 
According to Turkle, people easily connect with social robots, such as My Real 
Baby, AIBO or Paro, because these robots are programmed to ask for attention 
and care, and human beings tend to become attached to those whom they take 
care of. However, an alternative view on social robots is offered by Camille Baker 
(2018) who suggests that social robots like Zora, Pepper or AIBO could be seen 
as performative media. These robots are programmed to engage with users in a 
more vivid manner than images on the screens of mobile phones or tablets. For 
instance, Zora has pre-programmed scenarios to engage in dance movements, to 
shake hands with somebody or to act as an exercise instructor. Through the tablet 
control or the Wizard of Oz technique (remote puppeteering), it is also possible to 
create an impression of an autonomous robot.4 However, before we look in greater 
detail at what we mean by the robot body as performative media, we introduce the 
phenomenological notion of the body as a ‘double.’
3. The Phenomenological Theory of the Double Body
For phenomenologists, the human body (and the animal body) is never merely 
a ‘physical thing,’ but rather is the ‘lived body,’ a lived entity several features 
of which constitute the nature of a ‘conscious subject’ (Husserl 1989). Edmund 
Husserl clarified the phenomenological notion of the body by distinguishing be-
tween two dimensions of embodiment, namely the body as a physical, material 
and living organism (or ‘Körper’) and one’s own body as experienced by oneself, 
a conscious subject (or ‘Leib’). Indeed, ‘Körper,’ which is a German word that is 
etymologically related to the English word ‘corpse,’ is understood to mean ‘physi-
cal matter’ and to refer to the materiality of the body—that is, the body as a physi-
cal living entity extended in space. The German word ‘Leib’ is usually translated 
as ‘lived body,’ which carries with it complex meanings regarding the experiential 
and subjective aspects of the body (Dolezal 2009).
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Building on the approach of Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) re-
garded the lived body as anchoring the awareness of the world in an ‘incarnated 
mind.’ Thus, while the lived body can be understood in terms of ‘I can,’ the physi-
cal body is concerned with the passive physiological and biological operations 
that sometimes make (or sometimes do not make) the precise intentionality of the 
lived body possible. For physical reasons, flying is impossible for the human body 
without technological support. Yet, in dreams or using imagination, the lived body 
can develop the feeling of flying through the air.
The physical body is often understood as that which is experienced through 
‘external’ perception, while the lived body is viewed as that same body, albeit 
experienced via ‘internal’ perception (Welton 2006). However, this is not exactly 
true, since we are able to see other people’s lived bodies, to a certain degree at least. 
The complexity of the phenomenological distinction between Körper and Leib be-
comes clearer if we consider the difference between the physiological functions of 
the body and the expressivity of its bodily gestures or features. For example, when 
we attempt to interpret another person’s feelings by looking her or him in the eye, 
we do not expect the pigmentation of the iris (Körper) to express the emotional 
state of that person. Instead, we try to read the look in the eyes (Leib) (Flynn 
2009). When seeking to interpret those expressions in a person’s eyes, we move 
around his/her physicality (Körper) in order to apprehend the expressions of his/
her lived body. Additionally, when we seek to better understand someone’s state 
of mind or his/her intentions, we try to interpret whether the delivered expression 
is spontaneous or performed simply to impress us.
Yet, human and animal material bodies (Körper) are also expressive outside 
of their own volition and intentionality. The expressivity of the body does not 
merely emerge from the conscious gestures, postures and facial expressions of 
lived bodies. The material body, as a biological entity with its own physical state, 
expresses certain implications regarding biological age, muscle tone and health 
conditions. Moreover, different features of the material body (Körper), such as 
its size, height, weight, skin colour and sex, as well as body parts like the arms, 
legs and head, carry various cultural meanings and values (Gremillion 2005). For 
instance, the colour of the eyes can hold different cultural connotations that may 
actually affect the ways in which people try to interpret a person’s attitudes and 
state of mind. This happens, for example, if someone’s bright blue eyes remind us 
of ‘innocence’ or ‘honesty,’ which renders us more likely to believe that we can 
trust that person.
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The phenomenological distinction between the views of Körper and Leib 
forms the expressive system known as the ‘double body,’ which plays a central 
role in the power structure of social interaction (Parviainen 2014). Helmuth Pless-
ner (1970) has claimed that the Leib/Körper distinction is manifested in social 
interaction, even though most people do not necessarily recognise its significance 
with regards to the ways they are treated by other people. This distinction, in Pless-
ner’s view, largely makes sense to those individuals who feel that other people 
make judgements about them based on their physical bodies, while their lived 
bodies remain deliberately or unintentionally invisible to such people. Interest-
ingly, neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty recognised the contradiction or tension 
that exists between Körper and Leib as Plessner did.
Next, we apply this phenomenological theory of the double body in order to 
better understand how the robot body can simulate ‘aliveness’ and consciousness 
through its gestures, reactions and features. The conceptual distinction between 
the physical body and the lived body assists us in analysing how the animate 
movements of robot bodies appeal to human users as a performative medium. 
Indeed, we claim that the ‘double body effect’ helps us to clarify the nature of 
social robots in a novel manner.
Figure 1: Double body tension in social interaction
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4. The Double Body Effect of Companion Robots
Human bodies are growing and dying organic beings that are conscious of them-
selves and their surroundings. Human beings feel their bodies and express their 
kinaesthetic feelings and affective states through bodily movements. Robots lack 
lived bodies (Leib) as they do not have the capacity for bodily awareness. This is 
why robots do not have personal intentions, embodied intelligence or personal 
motives. They are only programmed to make moves or gestures. Neither do robots 
have physical bodies (Körper) of the kind that phenomenologists define as living, 
biological and physiological entities.
Social robots are material machines that are programmed to simulate dif-
ferent functions. That is not to say, however, that social robots cannot become 
culturally and socially powerful objects. Indeed, they are designed to be inter-
preted and encountered as social actors by the humans with whom they interact 
(e.g., Wada et al. 2004). Consequently, the fields of robotics, morphological and 
affective computing seek to simulate the impressions of living organisms and lived 
bodies through proper materials, gesturing, movements and voices. However, the 
question of what ‘social’ really means when these artefactual actors are embodied 
and embedded in human contexts remains unanswered (e.g., Bloomfield, Latham, 
and Vurdubakis 2010; Jones 2017; Meister 2014).
The aliveness of a social robot, as experienced by its user, depends on how 
its designers balance, in particular, two key aspects: 1) how the material ingre-
dients, technologies (sensors, cameras) and morphology (shape, size) are com-
posed (imitating Körper) and 2) how the actions (movements, gestures, voice) are 
programmed to represent an intelligent, conscious and socially interactive being 
(imitating Leib). Yet, the issue of whether or not a robot may become socially ac-
cepted and adopted by humans through its physical appearance or code of conduct 
remains ambiguous. When companion robots seek to find their ecological niche 
as new media among laptops, tablets, and mobiles in the increasingly competitive 
market for smart devices, human acceptance inherently depends on the charac-
teristic style of a given robot body as well as on how reliable a four-dimensional 
image and representation it provides to users with regards to its capabilities. Inter-
estingly, not all humanoid robots are designed to be clearly either male or female 
in appearance, since some feature a ‘technomorphic’ face that does not represent 
any gender or fixed personality (Parlitz et al. 2008; see Figure 2).
As an example of hardware, robot bodies are made up of a combination of 
data processors, sensors, video cameras, microphones, wires and rechargeable bat-
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teries wrapped in plastic, metal or fabric pods. In addition to the manner in which 
these components are assembled, the size and weight of a robot, as well as its ma-
terials, convey an impression of its cognitive and physical capabilities to its users. 
The humanoid robot as a bipedal artefact is especially challenging for designers 
because all its functions have to fit into a small and light shell in as economically 
efficient a fashion as possible. The concept of the double body effect allows us to 
capture how the materiality of a robot, including its size, weight, form, and colour, 
as well as its functions, may provide a different impression of the robot than its 
software, which is designed to create an impression of a conscious subject through 
its communication, movements, and gestures (see Figure 2). For instance, a ro-
bot’s movements can simulate the smooth and exact movement of a young adult’s 
gestures, while its material body can represent the character of an animal, a doll, a 
baby or a cartoon character. Such combinations of human gestures and non-human 
characteristics may seem contradictory, but they may also allow the robots’ users 
and audience multiple ways to interpret and define its character, body and features.
Emotions and emotional reactions towards the robot are, in our view, particu-
larly due to the contradiction between the robot’s body, voice, speech, movements 
and gestures being simultaneously robotic and machine-like but also human-like, 
culturally coded, gendered and entailing various anthropomorphic aspects. The 
fact that robots bring up emotional reactions in their users is not only due to mate-
Figure 2: Double body tension in social robotics
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rial or animatronic qualities of the robot or the human-like gestures or capabilities 
of producing utterances. We suggest that companion robots foster emotions and 
emotional reactions especially because of the way in which humans attempt to try 
to understand and define their nature and character.
5. Field Study: Zora in Care Homes for Exercises and Entertainment
An intensive single-case field study (Stake 2005) was conducted in two care homes 
and a geriatric rehabilitation hospital in Lahti, Finland, as part of Robots and the 
Future of Welfare Services (ROSE) research project. The City of Lahti purchased 
Zora for its potential with various groups of residents (older and disabled people 
and children) and its perceived easiness of use, meaning that no specific coding 
or programming skills are needed to be able to use the robot. The Zora robot in 
Lahti was the first one of its kind that was taken into use in public residential care 
services in Finland. The field study took place from December 2015 to April 2016. 
Technical training concerning the features of the robot as well as various use cases 
was offered to the personnel, care students and researchers prior to the introduc-
tion of the robot in the care units. There was also an opportunity to test-use the 
robot. Thereafter, the process of using Zora in the care units of the city of Lahti 
was planned by the project manager and the technology provider together with the 
personnel in the care units.
In line with the methodological triangulation approach (see Denzin 2006), 
the collected data consist of: 1) semi-participatory observations (see e.g., Ahren-
kiel et al. 2013) when introducing Zora and using the robot during group activities 
(27 sessions), 2) photographs as visual material and 3) six focus group discussions 
(see Krueger and Casey 2015) conducted with the care professionals and one with 
the older residents. In total, 35 care professionals and five care home residents 
participated in the focus group discussions. The sessions in which Zora was intro-
duced to or used for the activities with the older residents were planned by groups 
of 2–4 nursing or physiotherapy students or care professionals. To make it easier 
to approach and talk about the robot, it was given a new name, “Ilona,” as a result 
of a name competition among the City care personnel. Ilona is a Finnish female 
name containing the word “joy.” Perhaps the red color guided the suggestions for 
a female name.
The observations consisted of twenty-seven one-hour sessions wherein 
Zora was either introduced to users in a special session or used as part of group 
activities, such as physical exercises or literature groups. In all, five to twenty 
older inhabitants and two to ten members of staff and care students attended the 
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group activity sessions. The majority of sessions were observed by at least two 
researchers. One researcher typed down everything that was said, while the other 
two observed the non-verbal action, made notes and took photographs. Both of the 
note files (concerning verbal and non-verbal communication) were combined into 
a single document after each session. The researchers were thus observers at the 
background, but also partly participated in the exercises instructed by the robot, 
talked with the residents and helped them back to their rooms after the sessions, 
if needed. The care professionals worked with the robot as part of their normal 
working days; no special compensation for their (or residents’) time was given.
The field study was planned by the researchers and the city officials together 
and a research permit was obtained from city authorities responsible for older-care 
services. The researchers observed three different sets of sessions in which the 
robot was used. The robot was first used in one of the care homes for two weeks, 
then in another care home for four weeks and finally in a geriatric hospital for 
four weeks. The research interviews were conducted after the last set of observed 
sessions in the hospital. In sessions, the robot was operated to instruct simple 
exercises, play music, tell stories, perform short dances, and play memory and 
guessing games with the older residents. The robot was also operated to approach 
the residents by walking towards them and shaking hands with them while they 
were seated in a circle. It was also possible to hold the robot in one’s arms. In 
practice, Zora needs to be operated by a person in order to be capable of interac-
tion. However, as this was done with a Wizard of Oz (WoZ) technique, the older 
residents could not distinguish the autonomous capabilities of the robots from the 
capabilities that were remotely controlled by a person operating the robot. Thus, 
the residents could have thought the robot capable of much more than it actually 
did.
Since the city of Lahti purchased the Zora robot for the use of municipal care 
services, it has been possible for care units to book the robot from the technology 
unit of the current joint authority of municipal social and health care services. 
Thus, the care units can avail themselves of the robot for a few weeks’ period at 
a time. The care units in which our field study was conducted have occasionally 
used this opportunity over the past three years, but the robot has not frequently 
been included in their activities.
6. The Robot Body as a Performative Medium
When Zora was first introduced at one of the care homes in 2016, a member of 
staff characterised its body in the following way:
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You have to see immediately that it is not a human replacement, not a cat 
or a dog, but something quite different. (Interview with a member of staff)
This extract demonstrates people’s puzzlement when they cannot choose the prop-
er category for a robot between inanimate things and living beings, and so remain 
perplexed as to its nature. The older residents offered a variety of terms to describe 
their impressions of the robot, referring to it as a ‘baby,’ ‘toy,’ ‘puppet,’ ‘space 
creature,’ ‘ghost’ and ‘little fellow.’ When they saw the robot for the first time, 
they commented on it by asking ‘Did it blink its eyes?’ or exclaiming ‘Oh, look 
how nicely it is sitting.’ Most older residents perceived the robot to be amusing 
and cute, wondering whether Zora wore diapers and asking if it had a boyfriend. 
When they made contact and talked to the robot, they treated it as if it was a living 
being capable of hearing and seeing them. When the residents approached Zora, 
they squatted next to it, talked to it or held it in their lap as it was a child or a pet 
(Photo 2). This implies that Zora was emotionally appealing to the older persons 
and they were handling it as if it had feelings and should therefore be treated 
kindly. The residents seemed to be intuitively attached to the idea of the robot 
having a ‘lived body’ even though Zora had been introduced to them as a robot, of 
course. With the Wizard of Oz technique, Zora was steered by the care workers or 
Photo 2. A resident holding Zora (photo by Satu Pekkarinen)
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students via a laptop. Thus, they were operating all interaction between the robot 
and the residents. When the robot was talking and walking simultaneously, two 
people were involved in steering it. One operated the robot and another repeated 
the speech if the residents did not hear it or the robot’s microphone had failed to 
capture a user’s voice.
The operator was responsible for the talking, that is, writing the robot’s 
speech on the laptop, for example, asking general questions like ‘How are you 
today?’ The human operator also made the robot react to the residents’ responses. 
This required that the human operator could type fast and without mistakes. The 
members of staff also encouraged the residents to participate in the activities with 
the robot, and they provided individual guidance during the exercise sessions, if 
required. The human operators made the robot to refer to people by name and to 
respond to their utterances in order to foster interaction. This was also a means of 
intentionally creating an impression of the robot being capable of social interac-
tion and having human characteristics, like taking interest in others, which call 
for emotional bonding. The sessions involving the robot at least partly turned into 
performance scenes on the part of Zora even if the initial aim was to provide re-
habilitation activities and use the robot to instruct exercises or memory games, for 
example. This implies that, beyond its assistive role as an instrumental device, the 
robot transformed into a performative medium. The experiments followed Camille 
Baker’s (2018) suggestion that novel digital devices gather around performance 
practices as a new collaborative medium. One of the main indicators of a robot 
being treated as a performative medium was the residents spontaneously applaud-
ing after Zora’s dance shows and using salutations and compliments such as ‘bye-
bye’ and ‘thank you.’
The older residents offered perceptive observations of the robot’s body, ad-
dressing its peculiar physical features when compared to human looks and ges-
tures: ‘Where have you lost your two fingers?,’ ‘Its mouth is not moving [when the 
robot was talking]’ or ‘It walks like it has boots that are full of water.’ These ob-
servations were often found to reflect incoherent features in relation to the human 
physical body (Körper). In addition, the older people exhibited a tendency to offer 
an explanation for these physical differences, for example, assuming that the robot 
had originally had five fingers but had lost three of them.
These explanations can be interpreted to have also an emotional aspect. 
Paying attention to stiff walking and explaining it with having boots filled with 
water could be either a humoristic way of describing strange walking or a sign of 
empathy for stiff movement. However, the explanations for the robot’s features 
333Understanding the Simulated Aliveness of a Robot Body
were very human in nature: boots filled with water are very unpleasant to wear 
and losing three fingers would be tragic for a person. A robot cannot actually lose 
fingers or share a human understanding on how does it feel to walk with comfort-
able boots or with ones full of water.
Further, narratives and stories were composed as part of the explanation for 
(or rational reasoning behind) the robot’s physical morphology and gesturing. The 
attempts to understand, interpret and classify the robot seemed to be related to 
curiosity and partly bewilderment but not so much to emotions such as empathy 
or sympathy.
The inventing of narratives, explanations and reasons for the physical fea-
tures of the robot’s body, as well as the meaning of the robot’s gesturing, evolved 
as a collective endeavour through which new interaction occurred between the 
staff and residents. Thus, as Corry Kidd, Will Taggart and Sherry Turkle (2006), 
and Sherry Turkle (2011) suggest, the sociability dimension of companion robots 
is not limited to individual-robot interaction, but is more concerned with develop-
ing interactions between people who gather around the robot. New interactions 
emerged between the older people and the care professionals within the group 
sessions as well as when the older people’s relatives visited the care homes. Dur-
ing these negotiations, the main focus was on solving the enigma that arose due 
to the contradictions between the strange physical features of the robot and the 
gestures it made. Who or what is the robot? Is it a girl or a boy, female or male—or 
something else?
The care professionals tended to reinforce a female character for the robot 
when it was performing for the older residents. One reason for this might have 
been the fact that the robot was assigned a female name. However, interestingly, 
some of the residents questioned this gender construction due to the robot’s mor-
phology: ‘It looks like a man. It looks like a man because of its legs.’ Even if the 
staff dampened their enthusiasm by saying that the robot is neither a human nor an 
animal, several older residents still referred to the robot as ‘s/he.5 The following 
short conversation offers an example of how the gender of the robot was discussed 
between an older person and a care worker:
Older woman: “Yes, I liked it. It is a handsome boy.”
Care worker: “Could it be a girl? It is red, and its name is Ilona.”
Older woman: “Well, it could also be a girl.”
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The older persons seemed to be flexible when pondering the gender of the robot. 
Despite having a female-sounding voice, the round humps on its arms and legs 
could be interpreted as muscles more likely to belong to a man. This rendered 
Zora’s gender ambiguous or fluid (Dekker 2015). Surprisingly, this ambiguous 
‘transgressing’ gender of Zora did not seem to bother the older people, but did 
make them curious about the robot’s sex.
The role of narratives as an element of the construction of the aliveness of 
Zora became more evident when the robot had a malfunction or its battery ran 
out. In particular, the staff tried to hide any malfunctioning on the part of the robot 
by explaining it as being caused by the lived body of Zora. They described Zora 
[Ilona] as having embodied capabilities and weaknesses, just like a human: ‘Ilona 
is tired,’ ‘Ilona is acting up,’ ‘Ilona has not woken up yet’ and ‘Ilona is having a 
thought.’ Additionally, the older people actively constructed a narrative about the 
robot as a living creature: Zora was assumed to be frightened by a flash of light or 
to suffocate when wrapped in plastic for transportation and storage. These kinds 
of interpretations of the robot’s lived body called for emotional reactions like feel-
ings of sympathy or empathy for the “little fellow” who is tired, afraid or having 
difficulties to breathe.
The use of narratives concerning the ‘tiredness’ and ‘sleeping’ of the robot 
represents also a means of offering reasons why the movements of the robot are 
slowing down. The fact that the battery is running low can be hidden and explained 
away by human-like bodily needs. Similarly, the notion of ‘acting up’ was used 
instead of talking about a software bug (Turkle 2011). The technical problems 
that occurred with Zora were often funny, for example, talking too fast, although 
they were sometimes also bewildering. The operators were required to maintain 
vigilance when steering the sessions with Zora in order to avoid any problems be-
coming overly confusing or frightening for the older residents. The narratives that 
supported the conception of Zora as a performative medium attempted to maintain 
the illusion that the robot’s functions, including its malfunctions, were its lived 
feelings and sensations. In trying to provide a coherent, dense and undistracted 
experience for the older people as an audience, the operators had to improvise in 
order to maintain the illusion—or perhaps avoid the deception—of the robot until 
the end of the show.
However, not all the malfunctions could be hidden behind the narratives of 
the lived body when Zora was used as a reader and a fitness instructor. When Zora 
was steered to read a story to the older people, they struggled to hear or understand 
what it said. A human storyteller was needed to bond the listeners with the robot so 
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as to support the older people’s attention and motivation. When the robot was used 
in a rehabilitation session, one of the participants described the music it played as 
‘space music.’ Moreover, even if Zora was programmed to gesture with its hands 
while talking, both the participants and the observers felt that Zora’s contact with 
the audience remained limited.
7. Conclusions
In this article, we have addressed the human-like features, gestures and move-
ments of companion robots from the perspective of phenomenology. We turned to 
the phenomenological theory of the double body to evolve a novel understanding 
of robot embodiment. Using the illustrations of the double body effect derived 
from experiences during our field study, we indicated that a hybrid robot body like 
Zora’s is a combination of human and non-human traits that create a simulation 
of a lived body through its movements, voice and gesturing. In addition, people 
tend to socialize with the robot in ways that resemble their socializing with living 
beings: they try to define and categorize its nature, assume that it has a personal 
history and interpret its actions through bodily needs.
The double body effect of Zora, that is, its white plastic pod with its ambigu-
ous gender and Disney-style fictional morphology, combined with its innocent 
childish gesturing and teenage female voice, creates an equivocal impression of its 
nature. Zora’s animate movements simulated human gestures, while its material 
body represented a toy or an animated figure. However, the ambiguousness in 
terms of both the gender and the age of the robot body did not trouble the major-
ity of older residents, although they did sometimes adopt a conservative attitude 
towards the gender of human bodies. This view suggests that the contradictory 
aspects of the robot body were not necessarily confusing for these users, since the 
enigma of a hybrid robot body was seen as attractive.
Robots like Zora are designed to provide an impression of aliveness. We 
suggest that the simulated aliveness of companion robots results from four key 
aspects: 1) material ingredients, 2) morphology, 3) animate movements provided 
by software programs and 4) narratives created by users to support a robot’s per-
formance. The emotions that the robot brings up are related to all of these features 
and especially their combinations. The size, voice and morphology may remind of 
a child or a pet and call for empathy or compassion, the gestures and movements 
may amuse or irritate, and the narratives explaining what the robot is and why it 
acts in a way or another build emotional bonding and interaction, even if they are 
one-sided or simulated.
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The robot raised positive emotions in older residents who considered the 
robot having human needs like need to sleep or considered it cute or assumed that 
it has a life history which explains why it has only three fingers instead of five, or 
whether or not it has a boyfriend. Also, the robot’s actions and malfunctions are 
explained by narratives which entail an understanding of the robot having human 
needs and emotions like tiredness, changing moods and temper or joy and interest 
in social relations and connectedness. People talked about the robot as a conscious 
subject who is sometimes “acting up” or being “frightened.” Robot bodies can 
encourage and mislead users into thinking that robots are embodied intelligent 
agents that are more physically and cognitively capable than they really are when 
the lived body is well simulated and offers a convincing impression of a living 
creature. We have suggested that the ‘aliveness’ of the robot is at least partly con-
structed by the users, who tend to exaggerate the robot’s capabilities and refer to it 
as if it was a person. The functions and actions of the robot are interpreted through 
anthropomorphising in the form of a dialogue with the people who are present and 
that which is socially appropriate. An example of this can be seen in the narratives 
that disguise the technical problems of the robot in stories as if the malfunctions 
were caused by the robot’s embodied needs, temper and emotions.
Our article contributes to theoretical discussions concerning the robot body 
by introducing the concept of the double body effect to this field of research re-
garding companion robots. By applying this notion, we suggest that, on one hand, 
the material features of the robot and, on the other hand, its gestures and move-
ments, may have different, perhaps even controversial connotations. For example, 
the material ingredients and morphology of the robot can represent fictive char-
acteristics, while its movements can simulate human gestures and movements, 
including genuine (but child-like) communication. This impression is not neces-
sarily confusing, although it is captivating from the users’ perspective.
Finally, a central element of a given companion robot’s sociability is related 
to its role as a mediator between different groups of people, rather than to the inter-
action between an individual and a robot. We should not assume that people really 
consider the robot as a living being and conscious subject even if the emotional 
reactions of amusement, bewilderment, delight or even empathy and compassion 
towards the robot are very real. The narratives and explanations may be a way to 
try to define and understand the nature of the robot, but they may also serve for so-
cializing and interacting with the people taking part in the activities with the robot.
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Notes
This work was supported by the Academy of Finland, Robots and the Future of Wel-
fare Services (ROSE), grant number 292980, 2017–2021.
1. In the research field concerning artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, the 
concepts of embodiment and ‘embodied intelligence’ are understood differently than 
in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. Merleau-Ponty (1962) argued that 
thinking and cognition should be associated with bodily movements as ‘motor inten-
tionality.’ Pfeifer and Bongard (2006, 25) followed Merleau-Ponty’s notion in their 
book How the Body Shapes the Way We Think, stating that human walking and ‘lo-
comotion business’ have something to do with both intelligence and thinking. They 
pointed out that intelligence has traditionally been seen to encompass only abstract 
behaviours, thereby excluding sensory-motor processes. By the notion of intelligence, 
Pfeifer and Bongard (2006) refer to “…agents that are embodied, i.e., real physical 
systems whose behaviour can be observed as they interact with the environment” 
(Pfeifer and Bongard 2006, 18). They further stress that “…intelligence requires a 
body” while “software agents, and computer programs in general, are disembodied” 
(Pfeifer and Bongard 2006, 18). They conclude that due to being intelligent, robots 
only need to have a physical platform that is able to adapt to their environment, sense, 
feel and learn in order to categorise and recognise objects. However, this type of ma-
chine is not a conscious and living being like a human, who can give birth, grow and 
die. The machine cannot move intentionally as humans and animals can. Therefore, 
robots’ ‘intelligence’ is completely different from the embodied intelligence of human 
bodies. In this article, we do not take part in the discussion concerning embodied intel-
ligence in robotics, but instead discuss robot bodies by drawing on Husserl’s (1960) 
and Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) notions of embodiment.
2. Zora is based on the NAO robot of Softbank Robotics. NAO serves as a plat-
form and Zora robot is physically NAO but with a special Zora software.
3. For more information, see http://zorarobotics.be/index.php/en/.
4. The Wizard of Oz technique refers to a research experiment in which users 
interact with a computer system that users believe to be autonomous, but which is 
actually being operated or partially operated by an unseen human being.
5. The Finnish singular third-person pronoun ‘hän’ refers to both men and 
women alike. So, it is not possible to distinguish if people referred to Zora as ‘he’ or 
‘she.’ However, the use of this pronoun shows that Zora was discussed as if it were a 
person, not a machine or an animal. In Finnish, ‘hän’ is clearly referring to a person; 
objects and animals are referred to by using it (‘se’).
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